QE2 after three months
Here’s what Tyler Cowen had to say back on November 10th, a week after QE2 was announced:
I’m unhappy with claims that “we’re not doing enough” and that therefore this is no test of the idea of monetary stimulus. This is what QEII looks like, filtered through the American system of political checks and balances. And if it looks small, compared to the size of our problems, well, monetary policy almost always looks small compared to its potential effects. I’m willing to consider this a dispositive test and I am very curious to see the results.
Is it too soon to see the results of this “dispositive test?” In one sense it’s far too late. Monetary policy should target NGDP growth expectations, and we saw in the run-up to QE2 that growth expectations were rising rapidly on hints of QE2. We don’t have NGDP futures markets, but based on things like stock and commodity prices, and TIPS market inflation expectation, I’d guess expected NGDP growth for 2011 rose from around 3.5% to 4.0% in August to around 5.0% to 5.5% in November. At the time I argued that this was quite good news, although we actually needed about twice as much monetary stimulus. Unfortunately, I’m just about the only person in the world (with the possible exception of Robin Hanson) who evaluates macro policy on that basis. Most want to see how it plays out in the real world.
Some would argue it is too early to see the effects in the real world, citing “long and variable lags” in monetary policy. As you know, I don’t entirely buy the lag argument. I think it reflected misidentification of monetary shocks by the monetarists (and Keynesians as well.) And the asset markets seem to agree with me. For instance, when policy was very volatile during the 1930s, monetary shocks led to movements in asset prices that were highly correlated with contemporaneous movements in industrial production. That shouldn’t happen with long and variable lags.
Of course there is a distributed lag, as output such as the construction of new office buildings requires careful planning. Asset prices respond immediately to monetary shocks, whereas some types of output respond almost immediately, but the peak impact may be many months out into the future. So we don’t have enough data yet to see the peak impact. Here’s what we do know; starting with bad news, then the good news:
Bad news:
1. Real and nominal GDP growth was disappointing in 2010:4. The media called the 3.2% RGDP growth a slightly positive development, but the 3.5% NGDP growth was very disappointing.
2. The payroll numbers have been disappointing; although it’s possible the snowstorms impacted the data.
Good news:
1. The final sales number (both real and nominal) was quite strong, somewhere around 7% in 2010:4. The real number was the strongest since the 1980s.
2. The unemployment rate fell by 0.8 percentage points in the two months after QE2 was announced, the sharpest two month fall since 1958. As with the payroll number, there are questions about the accuracy of this data.
3. The ISM manufacturing activity number for January was the highest since 2004.
4. The ISM manufacturing employment number for January was the highest since 1973.
5. The ISM exports number for January matched May 2010, and was otherwise the highest since 1988.
6. The ISM services number for January showed the fastest growth since August 2005.
My hunch is that the truth is somewhere between the two extremes, and we are still on course for 5.0% to 5.5% NGDP growth. BTW, NGDP growth (or nominal final sales growth) is of course the only test of the efficacy of monetary stimulus at the zero bound. RGDP growth is useful for a different question; to decide whether stimulus of any kind was needed. If the NGDP growth is mostly inflation and not much RGDP growth, it would suggest that neither monetary nor fiscal stimulus was appropriate, rather labor market and tax reforms would have been called for. So far the data shows mostly real output gains, and relatively low inflation.
Please remind me to do this test about every three months. I may forget because I don’t think it is important. I already know the only answer that matters to me. But it is obviously important in terms of how the rest of the world will evaluate the ideas we quasi-monetarists have been peddling for the last few years. So far so good; keep your fingers crossed.
Tags: QE 2
7. February 2011 at 19:28
Scott: That´s about right. But you never know if the Fed will stay the course with thinking of this sort floating around:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989504576128130543513562.html?KEYWORDS=bond+vigilantes
7. February 2011 at 20:40
To quote from the above linked WSJ article:
begin quote
A stronger economy, which the Fed likely is welcoming, typically argues for higher interest rates.Though the labor market has been a stubborn laggard, investors appeared to take January’s head-scratching drop in unemployment to 9% at face value.
end quote
What an amazing quote. “A stronger economy, which the Fed likely is welcoming”. Likely? What else would they be welcoming? Only China and Germany actually want deflation here – right?
– and only the Fed welcomes this? One would somehow think we would all welcome it, even if it does raise the chances of an Obama reelection.
The WSJ deflationists, just like Kudlow or Jimmy Rodgers, just cant get their heads on straight. On the one hand they want a stronger market and stronger economy, but they just cant cant cant acknowledge that what the Fed has done has any relationship to the now (somewhat, though not enough) better economic numbers. Poor fellas.
7. February 2011 at 20:49
In other words – the WSJ and Kudlow and John Taylor and et all want to tighten money – even though they are all fully aware that to tighten money will be to increase unemployment and poverty for no good reason. Because unemployment and poverty are things they desire and want more of.
I always wondered why my father hated the Republicans. And he sure did hate them. Now I know.
7. February 2011 at 21:52
Tim Duy said some interesting things today in this regard:
“For those of us still fretting over a struggling US economy, the first week of February delivered a host of data that should raise red flags. Simply put, the solid activity of 4Q2010 looks to have carried through into the new year. This could be shaping up to be a far more interesting year for monetary policy than I would have imagined just six weeks ago.”
http://economistsview.typepad.com/timduy/2011/02/acceleration-alert.html
7. February 2011 at 22:26
I think marcus nunes hits it right on the nail. The question from an investing perspective is what does the market expect the Fed to do next? Will the market be dissapointed if there is no QE3?
My guess is no. But I do wonder what will happen in late spring, early summer.
Btw marcus, that article is nothing. Krugman recently linked to this blog post from Mish arguing that Bernanke has blood on his hand and that his monetary policy is responsible for the Egyptian revolution
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2011/01/blood-on-bernankes-hands-riots-in-egypt.html
8. February 2011 at 01:26
Scott, I don´t see so clearly the effects of QE2. Is it only a question of suggestion? Is it not quite moderate the increase in velocity and monetary base? I´m not an expert, but I see an stabilization of money, not an expansion.
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/fredgraph.png?bgcolor=%23B3CDE7&chart_type=line&drp=0&fo=ve&graph_bgcolor=%23FFFFFF&height=378&mode=fred&preserve_ratio=checked&recession_bars=On&txtcolor=%23000000&ts=8&width=630&id=BASE,M2V&scale=Left,Right&range=Custom,Custom&cosd=2008-11-03,2008-11-03&coed=2010-10-01,2010-10-01&line_color=%23006600,%230000FF&link_values=false,false&line_style=Solid,Solid&mark_type=NONE,NONE&mw=4,4&lw=2,2&ost=-99999,-99999&oet=99999,99999&mma=0,0&fml=a,a&fq=Bi-Weekly,+Ending+Wednesday,Quarterly&fam=avg,avg&fgst=lin,lin&transformation=lin,lin&vintage_date=2011-02-08,2011-02-08&revision_date=2011-02-08,2011-02-08
8. February 2011 at 03:56
Is the key goal of quasi-monetarists a target growth path for some measure of money expenditure?
Perhaps we have a test of the effectiveness of announcing an
increase in the quantity of money used to pruchase securities with positive yields relative to complicated schemes to pump prime securitization markets or promises to keep short term rates low for an extended period.
8. February 2011 at 04:00
Well, Scott, are you suggesting that Bernanke must be like an ilusionist, and move agregate demand only by his words? I suppose that NO increase in money may have only a temporal effect. And where I´d have to measure these market expectation for a higher NGDP? The commodity prices, for instance? the higher slope of the interest rate curve? how can I separate the effect of increasing world demand?
In the graph of Saint Louis FED, we see a LOWER velocity and a LOWER monetary base until Jannuary, just after Bernanke announced QE2. And Isuppose that 4thQ-NGDP is saying nothing.
8. February 2011 at 04:17
@Liberal Roman
That´s why I countered those “blood in Bernake´s hand” arguments in this post:
http://thefaintofheart.wordpress.com/2011/02/06/bernanke-and-higher-food-commodity-prices/
8. February 2011 at 05:16
And there´s this from Ryan Avent:
But to move toward the point, the latest employment report has some economists wondering whether the Fed will keep to its planned QE2 purchases. The message of that report was far from clear, but the changes in the household survey, including the near 600,000 job rise in employment and the drop in the unemployment rate to 9.0%, seem meaningful. This has Macroeconomic Advisers increasing its inflation forecasts and reiterating its warning that Fed tightening may come sooner rather than later. And Tim Duy has the Fed shifting its bias from more easing to tightening. Are they right?
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/02/monetary_policy_0
8. February 2011 at 05:59
Scott,
Above, Marcus Nunes takes issue with the WSJ article on bond vigilantes in the markets. To me, this is confusing. NGDP targeting proponents spend a fair amount of time defending against the charge that their favored policies produce inflation; and they spend an even greater amount of time suggesting policies that produce more inflation. Of course you want bond vigilantes to sell bonds because they think the Fed is “behind the curve”. That is how you get higher inflation expectations reflected in bond prices. You may want them to become even more vocal and sell more bonds, given your call for NGDP level catch-up. If they don’t, the QE2 is simply not working on expectations.
Same thing with the spike in commodities prices. Why bother blaming them on Chinese growth? Of course Fed policy would have the most impact on goods with inelastic demand and newly-emerged supply constraints. Accelerating commodities prices lead to higher inflation expectations. For NGDP targeting proponents, that is not a problem, that is the goal. Why take credit for higher stock prices (which are a function of lots of variables) and not commodities prices (which are typically most sensitive to monetary policy?) The latter has a much more direct effect on expectations than the former.
Of course, the problem is price distortions. Large changes in relative prices may have unintended consequences on the real economy. They are undesirable, and I could see why the Fed wouldn’t want to be blamed for them. Also, I could see why the Fed doesn’t want 10 or 30yr inflation expectations rising, as this is indicative of a lack of credibility (policy asymmetry). This highlights a problem of monetary policy. The Fed can control NGDP expectations, but it cannot control the path by which NGDP expectations are set.
8. February 2011 at 08:26
And now Lacker:
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/02/08/feds-lacker-re-evaluation-of-bond-purchases-needed/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Feconomics%2Ffeed+%28WSJ.com%3A+Real+Time+Economics+Blog%29
8. February 2011 at 08:44
Marcus,, Will they ever learn?
JimP, Yes, I can’t imagine how someone could oppose monetary stimulus right now.
Mark, I hope Tim is right.
Liberal Roman, That’s comical on many different levels. First that it would be the Fed’s fault if it’s policy caused higher inflation in Egypt. And second, that Fed policy actually did cause significantly higher inflation in Egypt.
Luis, That’s not the place to look. Look for market expectations of NGDP growth.
Bill, Money expenditures or money output.
I believe all policies work through expectations, which makes it hard to explain policy in a mechanistic way. Any approach might work–if it changes the expected future path of monetary policy.
Marcus, You quote Avent;
“This has Macroeconomic Advisers increasing its inflation forecasts and reiterating its warning that Fed tightening may come sooner rather than later. And Tim Duy has the Fed shifting its bias from more easing to tightening. Are they right?”
Meanwhile certain unnamed Keynesian bloggers keep talking as if we are in a liquidity trap, and only fiscal stimulus can save us now. (Rolls eyes.)
David; You asked:
“Why take credit for higher stock prices (which are a function of lots of variables) and not commodities prices (which are typically most sensitive to monetary policy?) The latter has a much more direct effect on expectations than the former.”
You entire comment is based on a misunderstanding. Quasi-monetarists never deny that QE2 creates some inflation, they deny it creates a lot of inflation. Just a return to a healthier growth path for prices.
Sure I could take credit for all the commodity inflation, and that would make my argument against the paleo-Keynesians seem even more powerful. But I am more interested in the truth than scoring debating points. And as far as I can tell the worldwide commodity price boom is 90% developing country demand and 10% QE2. I call it as I see it. As for stocks, I don’t think the recent increases are due to QE2, just the increases that occurred during rumors of QE2.
I suppose this makes me seem self-righteous. But in the long run I find that if you try tell the truth, it will help your cause more than constantly distorting facts, and then being caught making lots of conflicting argument. So even for selfish reasons it’s better to call um as you see um.
8. February 2011 at 09:31
Scott,
I understand that commodities prices could have been extraordinarily sensitive to Fed policy inaction in the fall of 2008, but also be highly insensitive to Fed action in the fall of 2010. In other words, I can construct a narrative in which this is true. It would involve some sort of “corridor” hypothesis. That is, within a corridor of “normal” Fed policy, China real demand dominates; at the extremes of Fed policy (tight/loose), the Fed dominates. Is this what you have in mind?
8. February 2011 at 09:40
We need to distinguish between the effect of market perceptions regarding QE2 and the effect of QE2 itself. We also need to consider QE2 in the context of events in Europe and political events in the US. There is really no way of doing this. Logically speaking converting $600 B in T-bonds to $600 B in excess reserves in the banking system that earn an above market interest rate should have no effect at all on the economy. If you see the fiscal and regulatory policies of the Obama administration as the primary barrier to recovery, then the election before and after the fact is the primary factor explaining the slight pickup in the economy.
8. February 2011 at 10:25
David, Fed policy drove growth sharply lower in both the US and the rest of the world in 2008. But that’s partly because the ECB and the BOJ did the same thing. It wasn’t just the Fed.
In recent months commodity prices have risen sharply as developing country growth has been strong. But no one would claim US growth is strong in any absolute sense. With 9% US unemployment one can hardly argue that the US economy is booming.
I’ve never argued that falling commodity prices in late 2008 showed money was tight in the US, just as I’ve never argued that the stock market collapse of late 1987 showed money was tight at that time. It’s a huge mistake to focus on any single indicator, unless it is NGDP.
Instead, I’ve argued that falling stock prices and forex prices and commodity prices and commerical real estate prices and residentical real estate prices and TIPS spreads all pointed to tight money in late 2008. If we had a NGDP futures market, it would have shown future NGDP undesirably low at that time.
High commodity prices do point toward easier money, and money is now somewhat easier. But expected NGDP growth is almost certainly still less than desriable, so in no way is this point in time the mirror image of late 2008.
Charles, You said;
“We need to distinguish between the effect of market perceptions regarding QE2 and the effect of QE2 itself.”
No we don’t, the effects are one and the same.
You have too much of a mechanistic view of monetary policy. QE2 mattered because it changed the expected NGDP growth rate, via changes in expected future Fed policies. You are right that the mechanical effect of swapping interest bearing-reserves for interest-bearing T-bonds is trivial.
Regulation affects RGDP more than NGDP. My interest is NGDP determination. Market indicators suggest that QE2 boosted expected NGDP growth.
8. February 2011 at 10:38
Luis, You said;
“Well, Scott, are you suggesting that Bernanke must be like an ilusionist, and move agregate demand only by his words? I suppose that NO increase in money may have only a temporal effect. And where I´d have to measure these market expectation for a higher NGDP? The commodity prices, for instance? the higher slope of the interest rate curve? how can I separate the effect of increasing world demand?
In the graph of Saint Louis FED, we see a LOWER velocity and a LOWER monetary base until Jannuary, just after Bernanke announced QE2. And Isuppose that 4thQ-NGDP is saying nothing.”
Bernanke’s words matter precisely to the extent they are backed up by future actions. The money supply does matter, but only the long run money supply, not the current money supply.
The graph you linked to does not include data from after QE2 was implemented (unless the horizontal axis is mis-labeled.)
8. February 2011 at 11:26
Scott, well, true, sorry,; but if I redraw the graph until december (last data) there is no diference at all. In any case, I don´t understand well the exagerated distance between words and facts. If Bernanke is saying that QE2 is moving, I can´t see it. I´m very happy if US economy rise, but I dont see the relation with QE2.
8. February 2011 at 11:40
Scott, take your pardon, sorry. If I remove the curve of velocity of money, I get the information of the monetary base until January, and yes, there is an (very little) increase in the monetary base.
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/fredgraph.png?bgcolor=%23B3CDE7&chart_type=line&drp=0&fo=ve&graph_bgcolor=%23FFFFFF&height=378&mode=fred&preserve_ratio=checked&recession_bars=On&txtcolor=%23000000&ts=8&width=630&id=BASE&scale=Left&range=Custom&cosd=2008-11-03&coed=2011-01-26&line_color=%23006600&link_values=false&line_style=Solid&mark_type=NONE&mw=4&lw=2&ost=-99999&oet=99999&mma=0&fml=a&fq=Bi-Weekly,+Ending+Wednesday&fam=avg&fgst=lin&transformation=lin&vintage_date=2011-02-08&revision_date=2011-02-08
8. February 2011 at 11:42
…But, really, a very short increase, indeed.
8. February 2011 at 12:13
Luis,
This is the graph I think you need to be looking at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=USGGBE10:IND
The rates are for the United States 10 year breakeven inflation rates. (Which are calculated by subtracting the real yield of the inflation linked maturity curve from the yield of the closest nominal Treasury maturity.) Bernanke’s Jackson Hole speech was delivered on August the 27th. In my opinion this is evidence of rational expectations in action.
8. February 2011 at 13:05
WWell,Mark, I disagree. Sincerly, I think that Rational Expectation Hyphotesis (in which I believe) would have to say that markets, seeing the monetary base data since Jakson Hole speech until now, would have change their expectation.
So, I´d say there are other factors (mainly expected higher growth in world economy) that explain higher breakeven inflation interest rates. I judge too early to assign the 4th Q growth to a QE2 that for the momment exists only in the mind of Bernanke.
8. February 2011 at 15:20
“Because unemployment and poverty are things they desire and want more of.”
Scott, Jim P. makes a childish remark like this and you let it pass, and, in fact, seem to back him up? Perhaps Kudlow is MISTAKEN to oppose more easing, but it is stupid and malicious to think he does so because he desires poverty and unemployment — a remark worthy of a ten-year-old child.
And Scott, you really “can’t imagine” why someone would oppose stimulus? It couldn’t be because they understand the macroeconomy differently than you do? I can believe you think, say, Murphy or Horwitz is wrong, but you really “can’t imagine” why they oppose stimulus?
8. February 2011 at 15:56
“I always wondered why my father hated the Republicans.”
By the way, JimP, most people hate the other party for the same reason Redskins fans hate the Cowboys or Red Sox fans the Yankees — irrational partisanship. They have identified their own ego with the “other” team, and therefore the enemy represents everything threatening their ego.
Bet that accounts for your dad pretty well, without any need for absurd hypothesis like Kudlow wants to eat poor children.
8. February 2011 at 16:12
Gene,
Actually, I thought Scott’s response to Jim P.’s (admittedly somewhat over the top) comment was quite measured. Has Kudlow ever shown any evidence of being in favor of looser monetary policy? Has he ever given the slightest impression that he even bothered to stop to consider what the very human consequences of a too tight monetary policy might be? Certainly there are real (supply side) solutions to poverty and unemployment. But sometimes the causes are demand related. (And “sometimes” means like maybe now for instance.)
Speaking for myself, Kudlow has shown an amazing amount of intellectual inflexibility throughout this recession. To be frank, with his “deer in the headlights” stare and basso profundo voice I consider him to be the Ted Knight of business and economics news.
P.S. Based on what I know about him Kudlow probably read Swift’s “A Modest Proposal” and thought it was a good idea.
8. February 2011 at 20:18
Scott,
If asset prices are the main channel for QE to work (and not only the direct effect of Fed buying of course), but the change in market perceptions that leads to generally higher asset prices (and I agree with that, but in a sense that if a future QE would fail to have a lifting effect beyond the direct purchase, that would signal market resistance to this drug), does not that mean that the Fed has significantly reduced its policy space for the future?
8. February 2011 at 20:31
Rien,
Hand me the printing press. I can always depreciate the currency further.
9. February 2011 at 05:03
Mark,
Absolutely, but what if you believe have to destroy all those freshly printed notes and a few months later you find out that you were too early (or rather you believe you were) and want to go back to QE? I would have preferred to keep a rarely used tool in reserve for when nothing else helps and/or it does not matter. And how do we know that QE and not some other influence has produced this outcome. Too much black magic for my taste. But again, printing money is an option that is always there. But if one adopts the perspective of a benevolent politician (one who cares about not only his self-interest but also that of the public and who generally tries to survive while doing or at least postpones his grabbing until when his vanity has had enough or the goose looks too attractively fattened), the question is what to make of all of the theories and institutions available. That politician must be pretty confused by now, especially if he (as a non-expert in economics) tried
to follow the recommendations of the finest brains in the profession. Maybe the profession is a bit short on solutions and long on maybes..And the old logic may be a little obsolete, with at least glimpses of rational expectations and a total definitional blur where “money” used to be. So what should a politician believe?
9. February 2011 at 13:51
“Has Kudlow ever shown any evidence of being in favor of looser monetary policy? Has he ever given the slightest impression that he even bothered to stop to consider what the very human consequences of a too tight monetary policy might be?”
You never saw Kudlow asking again and again for looser monetary policy in the early oughts? We used to joke that whatever happened, Kudlow’s solution was looser monetary policy.
I don’t know Kudlow personally, but I do know he went through a crash-and-burn coke and alcohol addiction, lost a multi-million dollar job, did the twelve step business, converted to Catholicism, and publicly admitted his problems. Now, none of this means he necessarily does care about others, but this kind of experience is likely to give one some sympathy for those having a hard time. And since we have a very plausible alternative explanation — Sumner’s view, while perhaps right, is a minority view amongst market oriented economists, most of whom think the easing has been overdone, why are you taking personal shots at the guy?
It’s intellectually cheap BS to attribute any difference in policy conclusion as due to “hating the poor” or such.
9. February 2011 at 15:12
Luis, I haven’t followed this closely enough to answer your question. The base bounces around for various reasons.
Gene, You are right about my implied assent. I focused on JimP’s longer comment, and must have skimmed over the shorter one (which you objected to.) I assume most people are well-intentioned, and simply disagree with me. I shouldn’t imply otherwise.
When I said I can’t imagine why various people oppose stimulus, I obviously know they say they are worried about inflation. But people like Kudlow generally put a lot of weight on market expectations. Certainly the bond market isn’t expecting high inflation. What I meant is that I can’t imagine why they don’t accept those market signals.
Rien, That’s a difficult question, and it’s not easy to give a verbal answer to. In a sense the current price level depends on both the current and the expected future path of the money supply. Changes in that path affect asset prices, which I see as the transmission mechanism. In the long run the supply of money drives the price level through the excess cash balance effect, but you need some sort of expectations anchor so that the price level is not indeterminate. One solution is that the government would as a last resort peg the currency to a commodity to prevent hyperinflation or hyperdeflation, and that implied promise allows for a determinate solution. But even the top economists don’t really agree on exactly how you pin down the price level. All we know is that it seems to work (most of the time.)
9. February 2011 at 17:40
Gene,
“And since we have a very plausible alternative explanation “” Sumner’s view, while perhaps right, is a minority view amongst market oriented economists, most of whom think the easing has been overdone, why are you taking personal shots at the guy?”
That depends to a considerable extent on how you define the term “market economist”. I know of very few American economists who would not consider themselves “market economists”.
I’m taking personal shots at Kudlow because I’ve had the displeasure of personally arguing with the guy. He’s a dim bulb and I personally don’t consider him to be an economist. I also think he is a very dangerous influence.
9. February 2011 at 19:19
Gene,
Here’s the world’s greatest anchorman who ever lived (by his own account):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqYMSkejABc&feature=player_embedded#at=52
Tell me he doesn’t remind you of someone we both know.
9. February 2011 at 22:51
Mark, I am not a Kudlow fan, and I don’t have a high opinion of his economic savvy. I just don’t think it’s right to say, with no further evidence than an opinion he shares with many others, that he loves poverty and suffering!
11. February 2011 at 22:46
“What I meant is that I can’t imagine why they don’t accept those market signals.”
The explanation is ideological blinders. Evidence inconsistent with the ideology is ignored.
12. February 2011 at 14:02
FEH, You are probably right.
13. February 2011 at 16:54
[…] my views on QE2. I’m not sure it was, as Mark never mentions my name. But he does link to one of my posts. All I can say is that his argument has no bearing on my claim that QE2 is working, because my […]
14. February 2011 at 05:36
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